Many services like car repair, medical, legal and consultant services have the characteristic of a credence good: The customers cannot verify, even ex post, whether the amount of prescribed service was appropriate or not. This may create an incentive to provide unnecessary services, that is, the expert may perform extra service that is of no value to the customer, but that allows the expert to increase his revenues. This is called demand inducement. Rational customers process ex ante the incentive of the expert to advise unnecessary service and update their valuation of the service accordingly. A low workload level (an idling expert), combined with a fee per unit of service time, may indicate that the expert has a high incentive to prescribe unnecessary service. On the other hand, a high workload level (a busy expert), or a fixed fee independent of the actual service time may indicate that the expert has little incentive to perform unnecessary service. When the arrival rate of potential customers is stochastic and the (true) service time is also stochastic, the workload level of the expert changes dynamically over time, and impacts an arriving customer's valuation and hence his decision to seek service or not.
Introduction
In many service contexts, customers do not know the appropriate level of service required for a complex product or operation. They rely on the advice of an 'expert' who typically also provides the subsequent service. Furthermore, it is difficult for the customer to verify whether the provided service was appropriate, even after the service was performed. If selling more services than what is really required allows the expert to make a higher profit, a moral hazard problem is created: The expert has then an incentive to advise unnecessary service. In the literature, this is referred to as 'demand inducement. ' An example is car repair. Car owners typically know when their car needs repair, but cannot judge the severity of the problem. The mechanic, on the other hand, can. After the repair is complete, the owner can observe that the car is running without a problem, but he cannot identify whether unnecessary services have been provided. In this case, the mechanic may have an incentive to advise unnecessary service in order to capture extra revenues. A noteworthy case occurred in 1992.
Undercover agents of the Californian Bureau of Automotive Repair (BAR) found that Sears, Roebuck and Co. was systematically defrauding customers by performing unnecessary repairs averaging $233 (Anonymous 1992 , Santoro, 1992 . At that time, the Sears auto repair chain was the largest in the US, servicing 20 million cars annually (Callahan, 2004) . In September 1992, they agreed to one of the largest fraud settlements in history. Sear's sales subsequently fell by 15-20%. The costs of auto-repair fraud in the US are estimated to be $40 billion a year (Callahan) . Ample anecdotal evidence about moral hazard problems in a car repair context can be found in the press (The Wall Street Journal, June 12, 1992; Llosa 1996; Koblenz 1999) .
Another example of services with a similar moral hazard problem is medical advice. There is an ongoing debate in the health care literature about the existence of physician induced demand. In a recent empirical study, Delattre and Dormont (2002) show evidence of physician-induced demand in France. They find that the number of consultations per doctor only slightly decreases with an increase in the physician/population ratio. In addition, physicians counterbalance the fall in the number of customers by an increase in the volume of care delivered in each encounter.
A third example is legal advice. Drawing on his surveys, the experiences of legal audit firms, and anecdotes, Ross (1996) concludes that over-billing is widespread among attorneys. Much of the 'padding' of hours is impossible to detect and "can escape the attention of even the most dedicated sleuth" (p. 23).
Since it is expensive, if not impossible, to detect service inducement, in the absence of ethical considerations, can we conclude that experts will always choose to induce demand? Two important factors affecting the expert's incentive to induce service are the service price structure and the workload level of the expert. A flat-rate price structure (independent of the level or type of service provided) makes it unprofitable for the expert to induce service. A variable-rate structure (composed of a flat fee plus a variable component that is proportional to the level of service provided), on the other hand, makes it feasible for the expert to consider service inducement. Even with a variable rate contract, service inducement is only possible if the expert's workload is less than its capacity to perform these extra services. Ross, for example, mentions that the incentives to padding and excessive time only can occur for lawyers who are 'not busy'. Attorneys that are busy do not have the time to do unnecessary tasks (p. 36-37) .
Rational buyers of services with a credence good characteristic process ex ante the incentive of the expert to induce services and update their valuation of the service accordingly. This affects their decision of whether to purchase the service or not and has revenue implications for the expert.
The same factors that influence the expert's decision concerning service inducement can serve as indicators to the customer in making this evaluation. For example, the use of a variable-rate contract alerts the consumer to the fact that the expert may benefit from service inducement. When, in addition, the customer observes a low workload level, he may expect that the expert has an even stronger incentive to induce service. If the customer judges the likely cost of service inducement to be too high, he may decide not to purchase the service. This phenomenon deters service inducement.
As service inducement is quite a widespread phenomenon in different service industries, we want to better understand its underlying economic motivation. Although in practice there are many variables deterring service inducement, like the possibility of a second opinion, the concern for repeat business (reputation) or ethical concerns, we focus here on the role that congestion plays in such a context. We refer to the literature for discussions of these other variables and the expert as a monopolist (i.e. no second opinion is possible) who does not have any ethical concerns about service inducement and has short term interactions with many different customers (i.e. reputation does not matter). Our analysis is not a normative one: We do not want to provide advice about when it is optimal to induce services, rather; we want to generate insights for managers of service systems about the temptations that expert service providers have in similar environments.
We demonstrate that even in the simplest setting with homogenous customers, the expert's pricing strategy and workload revelation strategy does depend on the characteristics of the environment (service value, waiting costs, market size and service capacity) in a non-trivial way. We determine the optimal price structure and workload information revelation strategy for the expert. By setting a flat rate for service (independent of the amount of work that is necessary to perform the service), the expert can credibly signal that he has no incentive to induce service. By choosing to make the workload observable to the customer or not, he can influence each customer's evaluation of whether he will experience service inducement or not. Each of these levers affects both the inducement-based revenue generation potential from an incoming customer and the decision of a customer to purchase service from the expert.
In the next section, we describe the related literatures in economics and operations management.
In the sections following, we describe the models with observable as well as unobservable queue length. In the sections following, we analyze the models and discuss the results. Darby and Karni (1973) coined the name 'credence good' for a good whose quality cannot costlessly be ascertained by the customer even after purchasing it. This is in contrast to 'experience goods' for which usage reveals quality (e.g. whether a car is a 'lemon' or not). Using a simple structure where the probabilities of the customer refusing the current service and refusing future service are known increasing functions in the level of the service proposed, they show that the higher the anticipated future profits from a customer, and the higher the ability of the customer to evaluate the nature of the proposed service, the lower the tendency to induce demand. Pitchik and Schotter (1987) characterize the Nash equilibrium in a single-customer single-shot game where the customer may need either 'minor' or 'major' service. Major service must be provided truthfully, but the expert can provide honest or dishonest advice (service inducement) to customers requiring minor service. The customer can either accept or reject the expert's advice. They find that a mixed strategy equilibrium (in which both customer and expert randomize) will result. Wolinsky (1995) studies the market equilibrium with one customer and several competing experts who also need either minor or major service. Again, major service must be provided truthfully, but service inducement may take place on the minor service. Experts post prices for these two types of repair services. Customers visit experts, but may switch to other experts after receiving the expert's advice. In markets with a large number of experts, Wolinsky finds that the customer's search for multiple opinions and the expert's concern for repeated sales (his 'reputation') induce honest advice.
Related literature
In markets with sufficiently few experts and without reputation effects, Wolinsky finds specialization of experts for minor and major services in equilibrium. Pesendorfer and Wolinsky (2000) extend this model to the case where the diagnosis quality is a function of the expert's effort, where effort is costly. They find that price competition may in fact reduce total welfare in this setting.
Both Darby and Karni, and Pitchik and Schotter take prices as given and do not consider the expert's price-setting problem. Prices are determined as a consequence of competition in Wolinsky, and Wolinsky and Pesendorfer. In all four papers, inducing demand is costless for the expert. Emons (1997) studies the market equilibrium with several competing, capacity-constrained experts servicing identical customers. The capacity requirements of customers for diagnosis and repair are deterministic. Diagnosis and repair are verifiable; therefore, all prices charged correspond to actual services that have indeed used some capacity. If total demand is larger than total industry capacity, Emons finds that, in equilibrium, the experts charge a flat price equal to the reservation price of the customers (that make the customers indifferent between buying the experts' services or not). With this price structure, the experts appropriate the entire consumer surplus while not inducing any demand. If total demand is lower than industry capacity, competition pushes the prices to marginal cost, experts are honest even with idle capacity, and all surplus accrues to the customers. In either case, the service inducement is not observed; the capacitated nature of the resource and the verifiability of the service provided preclude it.
Emons (2001) considers a monopolist who determines capacity and prices of diagnosis and repair, and investigates the impact of different types of information available to customers. When customers can observe services provided (whether or not they observe capacity) or observe only capacity, the expert invests in the capacity level that is exactly equal to the capacity required to serve the whole market honestly. When capacity is not observable, he signals his credibility by pricing repair services such that there is 'no money in repair' and setting a flat diagnosis fee in such a way as to extract all consumer surplus. When capacity is observable, multiple diagnosis-repair prices can exist in equilibrium, all of them extracting the total surplus of the customers.
While in Emons' papers, service inducement would consume capacity that could otherwise be used for other customers, Alger and Salanie (2003) incorporate an explicit cost to the expert of inducing demand. Customers are again identical. Therefore, in the monopolistic expert case, charging a flat-rate regardless of service type is optimal and eliminates service inducement. However, price competition makes flat-rate pricing less sustainable. In particular, the authors show that when service inducement cost is low enough, competition results in service inducement.
Other literature on credence goods introduces customer heterogeneity with respect to prior information, cost of service, or reservation price (Richardson 1999 , Fong 2002 , Dulleck and Kerschbamer 2003 . An interesting result is that in this case, the expert does not find it profitable to charge a flat price. The intuition is the following: Since with heterogenous customers, the expert is not able to capture all surplus using a single price, he may find it optimal to selectively induce service to some customer types.
Although capacity is an important element in the incentives of the expert to induce demand, it has been modelled only by Emons, who assumes that service requirements are deterministic. Such models ignore the economics of congestion however. While this may be appropriate for strategic-level questions about industry capacity, competition etc., it is not particularly appropriate for modelling service systems. Indeed, the Management Science literature is rich with models that show the importance of taking the congestion effect into account in the analysis of manufacturing and service operations.
A key driver in Emons (2001) is the difference between the capacity needed to service all demand honestly and actual capacity. In particular, any utilization under 100% tells the customer that the server has an incentive to induce demand. This logic obviously cannot be applied directly to a classical stochastic service system because 100% utilization is not sustainable.
In addition, the dynamic impact of the level of workload on the expert's incentive to induce service is worth investigating. In particular, a customer arriving when the expert has a low workload level may expect a high incentive of demand induction. This issue has been qualitatively discussed (but not analyzed) by Darby and Karni. We note that if the workload level is observable to the customer upon arrival, then this is a source of effective customer heterogeneity despite the homogeneous nature of the customer base. Following the recent literature on customer heterogeneity, we can postulate that the expert may choose to induce demand in this case. In particular, the expert can, by choosing whether to reveal the queue length or not, affect whether the customer base remains homogeneous or becomes effectively heterogeneous in the sense described above.
In this paper, we consider a monopolistic capacity-constrained expert and homogeneous customers arriving sequentially for service. The arrival time between subsequent customers and the service requirement of each customer is random. The expert (1) determines the pricing structure and sets prices; (2) chooses to reveal or conceal the queue length. We solve the expert's optimization problem and investigate conditions under which combinations of flat-rate or variable rate contracts and workload revelation or not would be chosen by the expert.
The queuing model we develop for this analysis fits in the queueing literature that takes into account the strategic interaction between the server and the customer. Such a strategic interaction in a queueing context was first studied by Naor (1969) . This paper and the subsequent literature (for an excellent overview, see Hassin and Raviv 2002) study the impact of congestion on the customers' and service provider's decisions. The closest models to our 'credence good' problem can be found in papers on service rate decisions made by the expert (Hassin and Raviv, Chapter 8) but in these models, decreasing the service rate does not correspond to inducing demand, rather it means that the true service time of each customer increases. Asymmetric information models in this context assume that it is the expert that does not observe the customer's type (e.g. Whang 1989, Balachandran and Radhakrishnan 1996) . In another class of models on reneging, Mandelbaum and Shimkin (2000) consider a model where the customer is not fully informed about service: When a customer decides to join the queue, he is accepted only with probability q, but he is not informed about whether he has been accepted or not. As time progresses, the customer updates its assessment of the probability of having been rejected; eventually, he reneges. To the best of our knowledge, a model equivalent to the 'credence good' problem that we develop here has not been studied in this literature.
The model
The customers. The customer base is homogeneous. They have a reservation price V for the service, and arrive at the expert according to a Poisson process of rate Λ with a service requirement whose duration is exponential with mean t. Since our focus is the impact of the pricing structure and workload level revelation on the expert's incentives to induce service, we do not incorporate the expert's concern for repeat services: Each customer in the Poisson stream represents a new customer who does not have a history of transactions with the expert.
1 Each customer incurs a dis-utility of c per unit time spent at the expert (in queue or in service). We assume an additive utility structure for the expert. If the expert decides to purchase service, his expected utility is V − E[service cost + waiting cost]. If the customer decides not to purchase the service, he gets 0 utility. Note that by allowing the expert to not purchase service, we are making an implicit assumption that either the service is not of emergency nature and can be foregone, or the consumer has some outside option which yields a fixed utility level, normalized to 0, and unaffected by the expert's strategy.
Information asymmetry concerning service time. The exact service time required by an arriving customer is denoted by t. The expert observes t, but the customer cannot. (In fact it's sufficient for our analysis to assume that the server can detect when service is complete, but that the customer cannot). If the expert works less than t, then, the customer is not fully serviced yet. We assume that incomplete service is observable by the customer and that an institution exists where the customer can hold the expert liable for incomplete servicing. Therefore, the expert works for at least t units of time. Let t denote the total service time the customer experiences. We say that the expert 'induces service' if t > t. We refer to t as the 'true service time' and to t − t as the 'induced service time'. The occurrence of 'service inducement' is neither observable by the customer nor by an outside agency 2 .
The expert. We assume that the expert has a monopoly position in the market. He decides the pricing structure, what information to reveal to customers and the service inducement policy. He serves the customers in a first-come first-served manner.
Information revealed to customers. We assume that the expert has control over the ability of customers to observe the number in the system.
Pricing structure. Let (R, r) be the flat fee and service rate per unit of service time. Customers pay for the total reported time by the expert, i.e. R + r t. We refer to a 'flat-rate' contract if r = 0, otherwise, we refer to a 'variable-rate' contract.
Inducement strategy. Let z ∈ N denote the number of customers in the queue upon completion of the true service time t of the customer in service. We consider the following service policy of the expert: If z > 0, then the expert does not induce any service time for this customer. If z = 0, then repair, a common practice is to return the broken part to the customer in order to show that no well functioning part has been replaced. For services not including parts replacement, it is a lot more difficult to show that no unnecessary service has been done. with probability α, the expert induces service until a new customer arrives. Thus, if α = 0, the expert is honest, if α = 1, the expert always induces service when it would normally remain idle, and as a consequence never idles. In that case, the utilization rate of the expert is 100%. Such a rate cannot be achieved in a classical queuing system with stochastic arrival and independent service times. In our model 100% utilization rate is only possible because service inducement on a customer ends as soon as a new customer decides to join. This model allows us to study service inducement using elements of classical queuing theory. For example, if α = 1, then the expected demand inducement the expert will do equals the expected idle time in the underlying queue. We focus on situations where the marginal cost of providing services is equal to zero. In practice, the expert may be hindered by ethical concerns when inducing services, or, there may be a probability that he will be caught when inducing services that defers him from inducing services. In order to have the sharpest insight in the role of the price structure and the workload information to the customer, we assume that the expert incurs no direct cost when inducing services. The only effect of inducing services is that it uses the spare capacity of the expert (if available) and makes the customer wait also during the time of the induced service.
The customer strategy. An arriving customer decides whether to enter service or not. We assume that a customer who decides to enter does not subsequently renege. The customer strategy depends on what information is available to an arriving customer.
(i) Unobservable queue length. We use the subscript u to refer to the game with unobservable queue length. Let S u ∈ {join, balk} and consider a randomized strategy such that β = P (S u = join).
(ii) Observable queue length. Let n ∈ N denote the number of customers in the queue and in service at the arrival time of a potential customer. When a customer arrives, the expert informs him about the number of customers in the system. If there is a customer in service but he is in the demandinducement phase, the expert reports n = 0. Each customer makes a decision whether to join or balk depending on n. Let S n ∈ {join,balk} for all n ∈ N be the customer's strategy profile. A threshold strategy can be characterized by β ∈ R + , with n = β and p = β − β such that
join with probability p if
If β is integer, then we have a pure threshold strategy, o/w we have a mixed threshold strategy. In order to keep the notation simple, we drop the dependence of n and p on β.
Information availability. We assume that the services provided are verifiable, either by the customer or by some agency. This means that the expert cannot claim to have done work without actually doing it. This assumption ensures that service inducement has an implicit 'cost' to the expert -it uses up limited capacity.
We also assume that the price structure and all other parameters are common knowledge since the focus of this paper is to analyze the impact of information asymmetry concerning the exact service requirement of the customer. We nevertheless say a few words about which of these assumptions are more likely to hold in practice.
It is reasonable to assume that the customer typically is aware of the billing structure. In particular, since asking for advice is costly, and having spent that money creates a hold-up problem in which the expert can drive prices up, the customer would want to see detailed information about the price structure before deciding to purchase the service. The expert would need to commit to these prices because legal action can ensue if he deviates from posted prices.
In most cases, the expert can judge, with a fair degree of accuracy, the level of demand for its services. Customers that inquire about prices but do not subsequently choose service can be one source of information. Information such as the incidence rate of certain medical conditions in the population, maintenance and repair requirements of various car brands, etc. are types of information publicly available that the expert can use.
Specification of the game. We consider a two-stage game. In the first stage, the expert chooses (R, r), which is observable by all customers. In the second stage, the customers determine their joining strategy. Simultaneously, the expert determines his service inducement strategy. This is a game with one 'long-lived' player (the expert) and infinitely many 'short-lived' players (the customers).
In the subgame equilibrium, the strategy of each individual player (expert or customers) is optimal given all other players' strategies; no player has an incentive to deviate from this equilibrium. We focus on symmetric equilibria in which all customers follow the same strategy. We first determine the equilibrium conditions of the customers' strategies, keeping the expert's strategy fixed (the secondstage customer equilibrium for a given α). Next, we determine the equilibrium condition for the expert's action given a symmetric customer strategy. Customer and expert strategies that satisfy both conditions are Nash equilibria of the subgame (the second stage expert-customer equilibrium).
In the first stage, the expert determines the pricing structure that maximizes his profit taking into account the second-stage equilibrium that will result (the first stage equilibrium).
Below we derive the conditions satisfied by equilibrium strategies in the unobservable and observable queue length cases, respectively. The detailed characterization and analysis of the game is left to sections following.
Equilibrium specification and analysis under unobservable queue length
Since the queue length is unobservable, the customer strategy is a randomized strategy where β is the probability of joining the queue.
The second-stage customer equilibrium for a given α
We focus on symmetric randomized strategies where all customers use the same randomization strategy β. Therefore, the effective arrival process is a Poisson process with rate βΛ. Since the service times are independent and have an exponential distribution, the system is an M/M/1 queue.
For given prices (R, r), setting the strategy of all other customers to β and the strategy of the expert to α, the expected ex ante utility of a customer who joins the queue is U u (α, β; R, r) =
Here, W Q (βΛ) is the expected queueing time in an M/M/1 queue with arrival rate βΛ and expected service time t, and equals
is the expected service time that an entering customer will experience, and is equal to t + α (1 − βΛt) 1 βΛ . The first term is the true expected service time. The second term is the expected length of the induced service time. To see this, note that service induction occurs with probability α if a departing customer would leave the system empty, which occurs with probability 1 − βΛt. The expected length of service induction is 1 βΛ , which is, due to the memoryless property, the expected time until the next customer arrival of a Poisson process with rate βΛ. This completes the characterization of the payoff of a customer in the game.
The best reaction of a customer, when all other customers play strategy β, is to join if U u (α, β; R, r) > 0, to balk if U u (α, β; R, r) < 0, and to randomize between joining and balking if U u (α, β; R, r) = 0.
(where 2 X denotes the set of all subsets of X),
Let β e u (α; R, r) ⊆ [0, 1] be the set of equilibrium strategies for the customers for a given pair of prices, (R, r), and expert behavior, α. β e u (α; R, r) can be characterized as follows:
that is, a symmetric equilibrium strategy β is such that β is in the best response graph of a customer when all other customers use strategy β. Let A denote V − R − (r + c)t, which is the expected utility of a customer finding the system empty and not experiencing any demand inducement. A necessary condition for a customer getting positive expected utility from entering service is that A > 0. 
Figure 1: These figures show possible best response graphs N u (β) and the resulting symmetric equi-
Interpretation of Proposition 1. According to this proposition, whenever service is induced (α > 0), nobody visiting is an equilibrium. To see this, take a customer who considers visiting the expert when all other customers' strategies is to not visit. Then the expected service cost to this customer will be very high (infinite, in fact), as the expert has an incentive to induce service until the next customer arrives. Therefore, the new customer will decide not to visit either. Thus, nobody visiting is an equilibrium.
According to Proposition 1, two other equilibria are also possible:
u . The customer's utility is determined by two cost components: queueing (congestion) cost and service cost (including any service cost due to demand inducement). Fixing the strategy of the other customers at the lower of the two probabilities, β 1 u , the expected service cost of a new customer is high (since the expected time until the next customer arrival is long), but the congestion cost is low. Therefore, the new customer may be indifferent between joining or not. If so, he will randomize with probability β 1 u . In this case, we obtain an equilibrium with high expected cost of service induction and low congestion cost.
Similarly, fixing the strategy of the other customers at the higher of the two probabilities, β 2 u , the expected cost of induced services is low (since the expected time until the next customer arrival is short), but the congestion cost is high. Therefore, the new customer may also be indifferent between joining or not. If so, he will randomize with probability β 2 u . We then obtain an equilibrium with low expected cost of service induction and high congestion cost. These three equilibria are 'follow-the-crowd' type of equilibria (Hassin and Aviv) .
When α = 0, only congestion cost plays a role since the expected service cost does not depend on the state of the system upon arrival. There exists a unique equilibrium visiting probability β 0 u for which an arriving customer is indifferent between visiting or not.
The second stage expert-customer equilibrium
Fixing the prices (R, r) and setting the strategy of all customers to β, the expert's profit rate is π u (β, α; R, r) = RβΛ + r (βΛt + α (1 − βΛt)). The expert earns R on each joining customer and, as long as there are customers in the system, earns r per unit of time that he performs service (true or induced). The fraction of time that the expert works on true service is βΛt, which is the utilization of the M/M/1 queue. The rest comes from induced busyness. Letᾱ u (β; R, r) . = arg max
this is the best response set of the expert fixing the customer strategy at β. Since π u (β, α; R, r) is linear in α with coefficient (1 − βΛt)r, α u (β; R, r) = {1} if r > 0, and
u (α; R, r) and α ∈ᾱ u (β; R, r) . This is the set of all expert-customer equilibria in the second stage. Finally, let A be a rule that allows to select one
for a given pair of prices, (R, r). For analytical convenience, we select in this paper the equilibrium for which the probability that a customer enters is the highest (equivalently, for which the expected queue length is the largest).
For r > 0, the expert has an incentive to induce services. Since we do not consider any kind of direct costs of service induction, the expert chooses to induce service when a departing customer would leave the system empty: α * u (R, r) = 1. Since we select the equilibrium with the highest probability of joining, α * u (R, r) = 1 and the largest of the corresponding customer equilibria determine the subgame equilibrium.
For r = 0, the expert is indifferent between inducing service or not. Therefore, any α ∈ [0, 1] may be an equilibrium. The corresponding customer equilibria decrease in the probability of demand induction, α. Since we wish to select the equilibrium with the highest probability of entry, we select α * (R, 0) = 0. For a feasible subgame, min(β 0 u , 1) determines the subgame equilibrium.
4.3 The first-stage equilibrium, or The Expert's Optimal Pricing Decision.
Since for all possible sub-games given (R, r), we have characterized an equilibrium with unique payoff for the expert, we can now derive the optimal (R, r) maximizing the expected profit of the expert that the expert would select in the first stage. Let Π u (R, r) .
; R, r) be the equilibrium profit rate for the expert for (R, r). Then, the first stage equilibrium (R * u , r * u ) is determined as follows:
We define ρ . = Λt and v . = V ct . v measures the number of times that one customer's expected waiting cost ct during service (excluding waiting in a queue) is contained in the value of the service (V ) and therefore is the 'profit potential' of the system, not taking any effects due to congestion into account. ρ is the ratio of potential market demand rate (Λ) relative to the true service rate ( 1 t ). Note that this is not the utilization of the server -the utilization is given by βΛt. Therefore ρ as defined here, can take values above 1. We refer to ρ as the normalized demand.
Proposition 3 In the case of unobservable queue length, a flat rate contract is optimal, with r * = 0,
The intuition behind this Proposition is the following: Since customers do not observe the queue length, they are homogeneous and the expected surplus that the expert can extract from each customer is determined by the service value minus the expected total waiting time for the customer,
Since all customers are homogenous, the expert can extract all the surplus. This surplus is maximal when there is no service inducement (t (0, β) = t). Therefore, a fixed rate contract is optimal for the expert. This result is reminiscent of Dulleck and Kerschbamer (2001) and Emmons (1999 Emmons ( , 2001 , who identify consumer homogeneity as one of the conditions under which the monopolist's credence good problem can be solved by means of a fixed price, extracting all customer surplus. In our case, customers are 'ex-ante' homogenous as the service value, V , and unit waiting cost, c, are the same for all customers. Since no customer observes the length of the queue upon arrival, customers are also 'ex-post' homogenous. In the next section, we relax ex-post homogeneity and allow customers to observe the queue length upon arrival.
Equilibrium specification and analysis under observable queue length
Since the queue length is observable, the customer strategy is a function of the number of customers he finds in the system.
The second stage customer equilibrium for a given α
We focus on symmetric threshold equilibria as defined by (1). For given prices (R, r), setting the strategy of all other customers to β and the strategy of the expert to α, the expected ex ante utility of a customer who joins the queue in state n is U n (α, β; R, r) = V − R − cnt − (c + r)t n (α, β).
Here, cnt is the expected queueing time when n customers are in the system upon arrival and the expected service time is t.t n (α, β) is the expected service time experienced by a customer who enters when there are n other customers in the system, and includes the expected true service time and the expected induced service time given that there are n customers upon arrival.
, with n = β and p = β − β .
A complete proof for β ∈ R can be found in the Appendix. Nevertheless, to understand this result better, let us interpret it for β ∈ N. Consider a potential customer arriving at the system and finding n other customers. Suppose that all other customers (past and future) adopt a pure threshold strategy β = n (integer) (join if S n ≤ n−1). Then p = 0 and ξ = n. If the new customer joins, he will bring the system state to n + 1. Two cases are possible: (i) n + 1 ≤ n − 1. Then, the next arriving customer will join the queue. If this happens, the current customer will experience no demand inducement. He can only experience demand inducement if no other customer enters until the end of his true service time, which happens with probability 1 1+ρ n+1 (probability of n + 1 departures before an arrival). Then service is induced with probability α and the expected inducement time is 1 Λ , due to the memoryless property. Therefore, we obtaint n (α,
n + 1 > n − 1. No arriving customer will join the queue until the system state returns to n − 1 as a result of customer departures. In states n and below, customers do join upon arrival. Thus, the probability that no other customer joins before the end of the true service of the current customer
. Putting the two cases together
is interpreted as the inflation factor: With no demand inducement this factor would be 1. Lemma 4 completes the characterization of the payoffs of customers in the game.
The best response of a customer who arrives to find n in the system is to join if U n (α, β; R, r) > 0 and balk if U n (α, β; R, r) < 0. If U n (α, β; R, r) = 0, the customer is indifferent between joining and balking in state n. Define N s (β; α, R, r) : R + → 2 N with N s (β; α, R, r) . = {n ∈ N : U n (α, β; R, r) ≥ 0 for 0 ≤ n ≤ n − 1 and U n (α, β; R, r) ≤ 0 for n ≥ n} .
N s (β; α, R, r) is the best response set of pure threshold strategies of an arriving customer when all other customers adopt a (possibly mixed) threshold strategy β ∈ R + . To see this, first suppose that for a given β, there exist a unique n such that U n (α, β; R, r) > 0 for n ≤ n−1 and U n (α, β; R, r) < 0 for n ≥ n. Then N s (β; α, R, r) = {n}: n is the customer's best response pure threshold strategy to β: He will enter at any state less than or equal to n − 1 and not enter at higher states. Now suppose that for a given β we have U n (α, β; R, r) > 0 for n ≤ n − 1, U n (α, β; R, r) = 0, and U n (α, β; R, r) < 0 for n ≥ n + 1. Then N s (β; α, R, r) = {n, n + 1}: n and n + 1 are both the customer's best response pure threshold strategies to β: He is indifferent between the two strategies and could randomize between them with any probability to specify a mixed threshold strategy. By allowing for randomization strategies at such points, we can extend N s (β; α, R, r) to a correspondence N c (β; α, R, r) :
and (R, r), the set of equilibrium threshold strategies β e (α; R, r) is characterized as follows:
Figure 2 illustrates one example with five equilibrium symmetric threshold strategies. The next proposition specifies the conditions that must be satisfied for a mixed or pure threshold strategy to be an equilibrium strategy for a given inducement probability α ∈ [0, 1] and a pricing structure
Proposition 5 For any (R, r) ∈ R 2 + and α = 0, β e (0; R, r) consists of the pure and mixed threshold strategies satisfying the conditions below:
pure strategy equilibria n ∈ N mixed strategy equilibria β ∈ R + \ N, with β = n 0 ≤ n :
For any (R, r) ∈ R 2 + and α ∈ (0, 1], the set β e (α; R, r) consists of the pure and mixed threshold strategies satisfying the conditions below:
pure strategy equilibria n ∈ N mixed strategy equilibria β ∈ R + \ N, with β = n n = 0 0 < β < 1 : U 0 (α, β; R, r) = 0 1 ≤ n :
Interpretation of Proposition 5. When α = 0, U n is a strictly decreasing function of n for any β: As the number in the system increases, the utility a customer derives from joining the queue decreases. A pure strategy equilibrium β = n is one that leaves a customer finding n − 1 others indifferent or willing to join (a), and finding n others indifferent or unwilling to join (b). A mixed equilibrium strategy β is one that leaves a customer finding β others indifferent between joining or not (c). It can also be verified that when α > 0, U n is strictly concave and unimodal in n: A low number of customers means high expected inducement cost and low queueing cost for an arriving customer.
As the number of customers increases, the expected inducement cost goes down, but the queueing cost increases. The two opposing effects lead to a concave unimodal utility structure. The difference in utility structure with α = 0 (no inducement) and α > 0 (inducement) is the primary determinant of the different behavior of these two strategies, as we shall see later.
When α > 0, conditions that determine an equilibrium threshold n should impose (d) a nonnegative utility upon arrival at an empty system (U 0 ≥ 0), (e) a non-negative utility upon arrival at a system with n − 1 customers and (f ) a non-positive utility upon arrival at a system with n customers. (Note that the latter two conditions are sufficient to assure the first when α = 0 since the utility strictly decreases in n in that case). If customers had strictly negative utility from entering an empty system, any system that ever empties (which happens with probability 1 for utilization levels of less than 1) would not attract customers again and would remain empty. Thus, in order to have customers in the long run, it is necessary that an arriving customer has non-negative expected utility. This is assured by condition (d). Conditions (e) and (f ) assure that if all other customers select a threshold policy n, the best response of a new customer is also the threshold policy n.
Conditions (d), (e) and (f ) are formalized in Proposition 5. A similar rationale holds for mixed strategy equilibria, resulting in conditions (g) and (h).
According to this proposition, whenever service is induced (α > 0), nobody visiting is an equilibrium. The rationale is the same as in Proposition 1. Provided that (a) is satisfied, a pure strategy equilibrium is determined by n satisfying U n−1 (α, n; R, r) ≥ 0 ≥ U n (α, n; R, r). Note that, as in the unobservable case, two costs components determine U n−1 (α, n; R, r): waiting costs and costs of service induction. For low values of n, service induction costs are very high, as the probability that no other customers arrives before the end of the true service is very high. Therefore, there may be an equilibrium with a low threshold value. For high values of n, service induction costs are low, but, waiting costs are high. Therefore, there may also be an equilibrium with a high threshold value.
We have thus identified a similar 'follow the crowd' effect as in the unobservable case. Due to the discreteness in the strategy space, there may be more than three equilibria in the observable case.
The economic intuition behind this multiplicity, however, is the same in both cases and is due to the service induction effect.
The second stage expert-customer equilibrium
For fixed (R, r), the expert's expected profit rate depends on the customer's strategy, β and α. The arrival rate at each state of the system is determined by β. For each joining customer, the expert makes a profit of R. As long as there are customers in the system, the expert earns r per unit of time. At times the system would have been empty with an honest policy, the expert makes r per unit of time with probability α. Let δ n (β) . = P (S n = join) and let p n (β) be the limiting probability of state n. The expert's profit rate is then
For a fixed β, the expert's best response isᾱ (β; R, r) = arg max
β ∈ β e (α; R, r) and α ∈ᾱ (β; R, r)}. We then select one equilibrium from this set using rule A: (β * (R, r) , α * (R, r)) = A(B (R, r) ). Similarly as in the unobservable case, we select the equilibrium for which the expected queue length is the largest.
Proposition 6 If r = 0, then α * (R, 0) = 0 and β
and β * (R, r) = n, where n is the highest natural number satisfying conditions (d), (e) and (f ) in Proposition 5.
This is an interesting result: The equilibrium with the longest queue is always a pure strategy threshold equilibrium. As for the unobservable case, if r = 0, then the equilibrium with the longest queue occurs for α * (R, 0) = 0. With no demand inducement, the model reduces to the one discussed by Naor (1969) or Hassin and Haviv. If r > 0, then α * (R, r) = 1. β * (R, r) is the largest of the corresponding equilibria. For example, in Figure 2 , β * (9, 10) = 7.
The first-stage equilibrium, or, The Expert's Optimal Pricing Decision
Having characterized α * (R, r) and β * (R, r) in Proposition 6, we can now proceed to find the optimal price structure. Let Π (R, r) . = π (β * (R, r) , α * (R, r) ; R, r) be the corresponding equilibrium profit rate for the expert. Then, the first stage equilibrium (R * , r * ) is determined as follows: (R * , r
Rather than optimizing Π (R, r) over (R, r) ∈ R 2 + and subsequently determining α * (R * , r * ) and β * (R * , r * ), it is more convenient to first fix (α, n) ∈ {0, 1} × N and find the price pair that maximizes the expert's profits over all pairs (R, r) ∈ R 2 + satisfying α * (R, r) = α and β * (R, r) = n.
This is a linear programming problem and can be solved analytically. Given the optimal profits for a given (α, n), we can optimize the expert's profits over all pairs (α, n) ∈ {0, 1} × N. Therefore, it is convenient to partition R 2 + into subspaces as follows: Ω 0 (n)
, which is the maximum profit that can be attained without service induction for an equilibrium with threshold n. Similarly, in any subgame with r > 0, β * (R, r) is determined by Proposition 6 for a fixed (R, r).
, which is the maximum profit that can be attained with service induction for an equilibrium with threshold n.
Let n 0 . = argmax n π 0 (n) and n 1 . = argmax n π 1 (n). Finally, letting π * 0 . = max n π 0 (n) and π * 1 . = max n π 1 (n), we obtain that Π * = max (π * 0 , π * 1 ). The next two subsections characterize the equilibrium without and with demand inducement.
What is very interesting is that we are able to characterize the equilibrium outcome as a function of only two fundamental parameters, v and ρ, that capture the four parameters in our model: V, c, t and Λ. In the following subsections, we explicitly denote the dependence on v and ρ.
Equilibrium without demand inducement
Proposition 7 The optimal contract is of the form
The profit-maximizing equilibrium queue
. For v 1, n 0 (ρ, v) can be approximated as follows:
When customers adopt a threshold strategy n, the expert's queue is of the type M/M/1/n.ρ n (ρ)
is the fraction of time that the expert is busy (his utilization level). The monopolist that does not induce demand faces the following trade-off: Decreasing the price increases the volume of customers that are serviced but reduces the profit margin. For very small values of ρ, there is not much congestion;ρ n (ρ) ≈ ρ 1. The service provider occasionally receives a potential customer, who will likely find the queue empty and experience low or no queueing cost. Therefore, a high price can be charged. When ρ < 1 but larger, more potential customers arrive and congestion increases. The service provider can decrease the price to have more customers visit him. For ρ = 1, the minimum price and the maximum equilibrium queue length are obtained. When ρ > 1 and large, potential demand largely exceeds 'capacity'. There is no need to decrease the price in order to attract more customers. Instead, the expert increases the price while remaining busy most of the time;ρ n (ρ) ≈ 1.
This equilibrium behavior has also been described in Hassin and Haviv (which pages? or section?).
The surplus that the customers capture in this case linearly decreases in the state of the system:
Customers that enter an empty system enjoy the highest surplus.
Equilibrium with demand inducement
In the case of demand induction, we find the following approximations for the equilibrium queue length. The behavior described in this proposition is illustrated in Figure 3 .
Proposition 8 For a given (v, ρ) with v 1, the profit-maximizing equilibrium queue length can be approximated as follows:
In the first case, no customer enters and the profit is 0. In the second case, the optimal contract is of the form
In the last four cases, the optimal contract is of the form
The behavior on 0 ≤ ρ < 1 v is contrary to the case without service induction, where the profits are non-negative for all ρ > 0. For extremely low values of ρ, no equilibrium with service inducement is possible. The higher the profit potential, v, of the expert, the lower the threshold for ρ is to obtain positive profit with service induction. Note that the very steep increase over
is invisible in the figure.
For the lowest possible values of ρ that result in positive profit under service induction, the optimal contract does not contain a fixed component. For v 1, the region over which this equilibrium is possible is very narrow; it is easy to see that
. Nevertheless, in that region, n 1 (ρ, v) increases very steeply and overtakes n 0 (ρ, v) in
Comparing Propositions 7 and 8, we see that for ρ ∈ [1, ∞], the queue length of with service induction behaves the same as the queue length without service induction. For ρ < 1, on the other hand, the queue length with service induction differs from the queue length without service induction, in particular, it is larger for
The economic intuition is the following: Remember from Proposition 7 that, when no service is induced, customers arriving at an empty system (n = 0) enjoy the highest surplus as they do not have to wait. By charging a fixed fee only, the monopolist cannot extract all utility from these customers. He can only extract all the utility from customers arriving in state n = n − 1, if n is the threshold level. With service induction, the expert can set a fixed fee and a variable fee. This allows him to extract more surplus from the customers. From Proposition 5, we know that the expected utility under service induction is a concave function of the state of the system upon arrival. By choosing appropriately the fixed and variable fee, the expert will also extract all surplus from the customers arriving at an empty system. Consider a high threshold level n 1. Then, the main cost component that the customers experience when joining at state n − 1 is the waiting costs, as expected service induction costs are very low (i.e. I 1 n−1 (ρ) ≈ 1). The expected utility of these customers is approximately V − R − (n − 1) ct − (c + r) t. The first terms are the utility for the service, from which the fixed fee is subtracted. The latter terms are the expected waiting costs in the queue and the expected waiting plus variable service costs during the service time. The main cost component of customers joining an empty system is the expected service induction cost, as these customers does not have to wait in the queue: V − R − (c + r) tI 1 1 (ρ). The first terms in these two expressions are the same. The last term is the expected waiting plus variable service costs during the total service time (true and induced). When extracting all surplus from both customers arriving in state 0 and state n − 1, the expert will choose to set the variable fee such that (c + r) tI 1 1 (ρ) ≈ (n − 1) ct + (c + r) t. The fixed fee is then determined by R ≈ V − (n − 1) ct − (c + r) t. The first equation determines the variable fee:
The fixed fee is then determined by
. The expert's revenues with service induction are determined by both fixed and variable fees and can be rewritten as
where the first term is exactly equal to the profits in case of no service induction. The second term is the extra profit stream that the expert can capture with demand induction. This term modifies the optimal queue length of the expert when inducing demand. Note the term is negative for n < I 1 1 (ρ) and positive for n > I 1 1 (ρ). Thus, there exists a minimum queue length above which service induction can result in higher profits than the corresponding system without service induction (where prices are set such that the equilibrium n is the same in both systems). This is the 'follow the crowd' effect discussed earlier. For greater values of ρ, the follow the crowd effect is reduced asρ n (ρ) ≈ 1. For very small but positive values of ρ, the inflation factor, I 1 1 (ρ), is very high. Then, it is necessary that the threshold, n − 1, be very high for the profit to be higher under demand inducement. A high equilibrium threshold value, in turn, requires a low fixed cost. 
Comparison of demand inducement vs. no demand inducement equilibria
When determining when service induction is more profitable for the expert than no service induction, we need to characterize for which region in the (v, ρ) space we have that π *
. It is very difficult to describe analytically the locus for which π * 0 (ρ, v) = π * 1 (ρ, v), as both π * i (ρ, v) actually is the solution to an optimization problem over π i (n; ρ, v). The following Proposition provides some insight:
Proposition 9 For v 1, there exist a ρ (v) such that:
According to Proposition 9, experts prefer a variable rate contract when the profit potential is high and the normalized demand market is neither high nor low. For intermediate normalized demand, service induction is optimal. Remember from Propositions 8 and 7 that for ρ ∈ [1, √ v] and v 1, we obtain n 1 (v, ρ) ≈ n 0 (v, ρ). Asρ n (ρ) ≈ 1, we obtain with (6) that π *
. Thus, the advantage of service induction will be very small in that case. For ρ ∈ [ √ v, +∞], we obtain with Propositions 8 and 7 that n 1 (v, ρ) ≈ n 0 (v, ρ) ∈ {1, 2}. Thus, for very high normalized demand, not inducing services becomes strictly preferable for thresholds less than or equal to 2. Figure 4 illustrates the conditions under which a variable rate contract is optimal. For low values of v, service induction is not optimal. The minimum profit potential occurs for ρ = 1 and is v ≈ 9.5.
The region where the variable rate contract is more profitable extends well beyond ρ = 1.
The Expert's Optimal Workload Revelation and Price Structure
In this section, we compare the expert's profits when concealing the workload, as characterized by Proposition 3 to the expert's profits when revealing the workload, as characterized by Propositions 7 and 8.
Proposition 10 For v 1, there exist a ρ (v) such that:
Concealing the queue length allows the expert to extract all surplus as customers are then homogenous, before arrival as well as after arrival. However, some customers may join when the queue length is very long (which is inefficient), or may balk when the queue is empty (which is also Proposition 10, concealing the queue length is the optimal strategy for low normalized demand. For a certain level of normalized demand that is still less than 1, revealing the queue length with demand induction becomes optimal. For higher levels of normalized demand, revealing remains optimal, but, the optimal price structure will change for very high levels of normalized demand as discussed in the Proposition 9.
The Impact of Service Induction
Finally, we can compare the total surplus and the consumer surplus of the different systems. T 0 (n 0 ) and T 1 (n 1 ) denote the total surplus without and with service induction when the threshold is n 0 and n 1 respectively. Then, we obtain:
(V − c (n + 1) t) p n (n 0 ) and T 1 (n 1 ) = n1−1 n=0 V − c n + I min(n+1,n1−1) (ρ) t p n (n 1 ) .
In the case of no service induction, the term in parentheses is the utility generated by service reduced by the expected waiting cost (queuing and service) incurred by a customer who enters when the number in system is n. With service induction, the customer waiting time also includes waiting time during induced service. Therefore, if n 0 = n 1 , the total surplus without service induction will be higher than the total surplus with service induction. Compared to the socially optimum, too few customers will visit the expert that does not induce services, due to his monopoly power (Hassin and Haviv) . From Propositions 7 and 8, we know that more customers visit the expert with demand induction, due to the follow the crowd effect. Thus, potentially, the total surplus may increase when inducing services if the gains from having more customers visiting are larger than the extra waiting costs that are generated. This is indeed the case, as illustrated by Figure 5 . The consumer surplus can easily be derived from the total surplus minus the expert's profits.
Numerical experiments show that it may be possible that consumer surplus can increase with service induction. These observation open an interesting question from a regulator's point of view: Should he encourage service induction? Obviously not in the case that the regulator also can reduce the monopoly power of the expert. Our model reveals two oppositive effects of service induction on the social welfare: On one hand, extra unnecessary waiting time during the service induction period is introduced which reduces the social welfare, while on the other hand, more customers visit the expert, which increases the social welfare.
Conclusions and Further Research
In this paper, we study the choice of price structure and workload information revelation of a monopolist who sells services to customers that do not know the service time that is appropriate for them. This occurs when service involves a complex product or system about which the expert has superior knowledge. In such an environment, the expert may have an incentive to induce unnecessary services, depending on the price structure and on the expert's workload level. With a time-variable contract, the expert's revenues increase as a function of the total service time. If with such a contract, the expert's workload is low, he may have strong incentives to induce services (referred to as "timepadding", Ross 1996), which is extremely difficult for the customer to contest. As in many service environments, customer arrival times are stochastic, as well as customer service times, the workload level of the expert fluctuates over time. Customers can infer the expert's incentives from the price structure and the expert's workload. The expert has two levers to impact the customer's decision to visit the expert: (1) he can make his workload invisible to an arriving customer and (2) he can charge a price that is independent of the service time (a flat price). In both cases, the expert does not have an incentive to perform unnecessary services. We introduce a simple queuing model that captures the key workload dynamics. Within our framework, we determine the best policy for the expert, as a function of the characteristics of the environment. We find that two parameters dictate the optimal policy for the expert: (1) the normalized demand, which is the ratio of the potential market demand (customers per unit of time) over the service rate and (2) the profit potential, which is the ratio of the service value over the waiting costs during service. Table 8 summarizes our findings.
For low levels of profit potential, the expert never induces services and charges a fixed fee only. The expert conceals the workload for low levels of normalized demand only. This situation is the same as discussed in Hassin and Haviv, p. 53.
For high levels of profit potential and low levels of normalized demand, concealing the workload is optimal. When concealing the workload level, all customers are also ex post (i.e. after arrival)
homogenous and the expert extracts all surplus from the customer. In order to extract the maximum surplus, the expert does not want to induce unnecessary service and charges a fixed fee. When the normalized demand increases, concealing the workload becomes less efficient as customers may enter when the queue length is long and decide to balk when the queue is empty. There exists a level of normalized demand less than 1 for which revealing the workload becomes optimal for the expert, who charges a fixed and a variable fee. In that case, the expert also induces unnecessary service.
When revealing the workload, customers become heterogenous ex post (i.e. after arrival), as they will decide whether to join the expert's queue or to balk, depending on the number of customers that are already in the expert's system. Due to the possibility of service induction, the expert captures also a part of the surplus that customers otherwise enjoy in an empty system. The customer surplus is a concave function of the state of the queue. Furthermore, the equilibrium queue length is longer than the queue length of an expert that does not induce unnecessary service. This is due to a 'follow the crowd' effect when inducing services: when more other customers are joining the queue, the expected service induction costs decrease, making it more attractive for customers to join.
For very high levels of normalized demand, with a ratio higher than 1, the expert still reveals his workload level, but charges a fixed fee only and, consequently, does not induce unnecessary services.
The customers' expected utility is a linearly decreasing function of the state of the system: When arriving at an empty queue, the customer enjoys the highest surplus.
Finally, we find that the total surplus may increase with service induction, compared to no service induction. The reason is that a monopolist that does not induce services restricts too much the queue length, compared to the social optimal. With service induction, on one hand, extra waiting costs are incurred during the induced service time. On the other hand, more customers will visit the expert because of the 'follow-the-crowd' effect. It may be that the increase in customers is the dominating effect.
We believe that our model contributes to both the economic literature on credence goods by studying explicitly dynamic effects of service induction that have been ignored by economists. We also believe that our model contributes to the literature in Operations Management as we study a phenomenon, service induction, in a context where congestion plays a role and for which quite some anecdotal evidence in different service industries has been reported. Furthermore, note that the model is quite sparse (with only two important parameters; ρ and v), but, in our opinion, captures the first order effects of service induction in a dynamic environment. Despite being sparse, be we believe that at the same time is rich as we have identified different phenomena in the (v, ρ)
space. Obviously, in order to obtain such a sparse model that is analyzable, we needed ignored some aspects that may play a role in real life situations. We hope to relax in further research some of these assumptions and increase our understanding of the phenomenon further.
Wolinksy, A. (1993). Competition in a Market for Informed Experts' Services. RAND Journal of
Economics 24: 380-398.
Appendix
In what follows, we only consider customer strategies that satisfy β < 1 Λt since the M/M/1 queue would not be stable otherwise.
Lemma A 1 Let A . = V − R − (c + r)t. For α = 0, we have: For α > 0, we have: Proof. We begin by proving that for any (R, r) ∈ R 2 + , (i) U u (β, α; R, r) is concave in β for any Λt ], and positive on (β 1 , β 2 ). Otherwise, U u (β, α; R, r) = 0 either has no real root or one double root. In either case,
Λt ]. Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose r > 0. Then, as argued above,ᾱ u (β; R, r) = 1 for any feasible value of β. Then, B u (R, r) is the set of equilibria with α = 1 and any of the corresponding equilibria defined in Proposition 1 for α = 1. Recall that we focus on the equilibrium that results in the highest probability of entry. Therefore α * u (R, r) = 1 and β * u (R, r) is the largest element in the set β e u (1; R, r). Note that if U u (β u , 1; R, r) does not have two distinct roots β 
,
It can be shown that √ w 2 − 4α − 2 (w + 2) + 2 + 2α − w 2 = 0 ⇔ w = −1 − α, or,
dα is negative (positive) for one value of α, then it is negative (positive) for all other values of α ∈ [0, 1]. We find that for α = 1, Λt dβ
for all w > 0. Therefore, we obtain that dβ 2 u dα < 0 for all α ∈ [0, 1] and w > 0. Thus, the largest β 2 u occurs for α = 0. Therefore, we select α * u (R, 0) = 0. Then U u (β, 0; R, 0) = V − c
Proof of Proposition 3. Let us begin by showing that a flat-rate contract with r * = 0 is optimal.
For any feasible (β * u (R, r) > 0) contract (R, r) with r > 0, we can construct a contract (R , 0)
is a necessary condition for stability, we conclude that β * u (R , 0) > β * u (R, r). Substituting into the expression for Π u , we find that Π u (R , 0) > Π u (R, r). Thus, we can maximize Π u (R, r) by searching over contracts of the type (R, 0). 
Proof of Lemma 4:
Step 1: Some useful properties of ξ (β). Before proceeding with the proof, we derive some properties of ξ (β) that will prove to be useful. Remember that p = β − β and n = β . P1: If n ≥ 1, then (1 − n) + = 0 and ξ = n+ ln (1+pρ) ln(1+ρ) . In this case,
ln(1+ρ) . In this case,
Step 2: Derivation oft n (α, β). Consider an arriving customer who finds n others in queue.
Under the FCFS discipline, this customer can experience service inducement only in the event that the queue is empty upon termination of his true service time, that is, in the event that no other customer enters the system during the true service time of this customer or of the n customers in line in front of him. The probability of this event depends on the strategy that the other customers follow.
We call this probability P n (β) to denote the dependence on n and β. Thus, with probability P n (β), the queue is empty at the completion of the true service time of the customer under consideration.
At that point, the expert induces service with probability α until the arrival of the next customer.
The length of the service inducement is determined as follows:
Case (a): For any strategy β ≥ 1, the arrival rate to the system in state 0 is Λ. The expected time between the true service completion of the last customer and the arrival of the first new customer is then 1 Λ , due to the memoryless property of Poisson arrivals. Therefore, the expected length of service induction is 1 Λ . The expected total service time is thent n (α, β) = t + αP n (β) 1 Λ for β ≥ 1, where the first term is the true service time and the second term is the expected induced service time.
Case (b): For β ∈ [0, 1], the arrival rate to the system in state 0 is βΛ = pΛ. The expected time since true service completion of the last customer until the arrival of the next customer is then 1 pΛ . Therefore, the expected length of service induction is 1 pΛ , due to the memoryless property of Poisson arrivals. The expected total service time is thent n (α, β) = t + αP n (β) 1 pΛ for β ∈ [0, 1).
Step 3: Derivation of P n (β).
Let n be the state of the system when a potential customer arrives. If this customer joins the queue the state is increased to n + 1. All other customers follow strategy β; n = β . The queue will be empty upon termination of his true service time if the Markov process goes from state n + 1 through states n, n − 1, . . . , 0 before the next customer arrives and decides to join. Depending on the value of β, we have the following cases:
Case (ia): 0 ≤ n < n − 1. In this case, n + 1 < n. Since n + 1 < n, any arriving customer will join. Therefore P n (β) equals the probability that at each state n ∈ [1, n + 1], a service completion occurs before a new customer arrival. This is µ µ+Λ in each state. Therefore,
Case (ib): n ≥ n − 1. In this case n + 1 ≥ n. For all n higher than n, no customer joins (according to the strategy β). Therefore, with probability 1, the system state will return to n.
Since arriving customers join with probability p in state n, the probability that a service completion occurs before a new customer joins the queue is µ µ+pΛ . For all other states n ∈ [1, n − 1], an arriving customer will enter the queue and the probability that a service completion occurs before a new customer arrival is, analogous to the previous case, . Using (P1), the latter probability can be rewritten as
Thus, we have obtained that αP n (β)
Here, any n ≥ 0 satisfies n + 1 ≥ n. Applying case (ib) with n = 1, we obtain P n (β) = 1 1+pρ . Using (P1), the latter probability can be rewritten as
. Note that in this case min (n + 1, ξ − 1) = ξ − 1 as ξ < 1 and n ≥ 0. Cases (i) and (ii) can be summarized as follows:
For all n higher than n = 0, no customer joins (according to the strategy β). In particular, no customer will join while the customer who last joined is in service. Therefore, with probability 1, the system state will return to n = 0. This gives P n (β) = 1. Note that in this case
Thus, using (P2), we can write αP n (β)
Summarizing cases (i-iii), we obtaint n (α, β) = t 1 + α 1 1+ρ min(n+1,ξ−1) 1 ρ . Proof of Proposition 5.
Case 1: α = 0. Note that U n (0, β; R, r) = V − R − cnt − (c + r)t decreases in n and is independent of β.
Pure strategy equilibria: If U n−1 (0, n; R, r) ≥ 0, it follows that U n (0, β; R, r) ≥ 0 for n ∈ [0, n − 1]. Thus, if in addition, U n (0, n; R, r) ≤ 0, it is optimal for all arriving customers to follow a (pure) threshold strategy n.
Mixed strategy equilibria: If U n (0, β; R, r) = 0, then the customer is indifferent in state n between joining or not. Therefore, any randomization between thresholds n (balking at n) and n + 1 (joining at n, but balking at n + 1) is an equilibrium, i.e. all β such that β = n are equilibria.
Case 2: α > 0. Note that for fixed (α, β; R, r), U n (α, β; R, r) has a linear term (−cnt) decreasing in n and a term (−t n (α, β)) that is concave increasing in n for n ≤ ξ (β) − 1 and constant for n ≥ ξ (β) − 1. Therefore, U n (α, n; R, r) is concave in n.
Pure strategy equilibria: First, note that n = 0 is an equilibrium for any (R, r): As ξ (0) = +∞ (see P3 of Lemma 4), U 0 (α, 0; R, r) = −∞ and therefore no customer ever enters the system in state 0, provided that all other customers adopt the threshold strategy n = 0. Thus, n = 0 is an equilibrium.
Assume that the threshold strategy of the other customers is β = n ≥ 1, with n ∈ N. As U n (α, n; R, r) is concave in n, a new customer will also adopt a threshold strategy n if and only if (1) the net expected utility when entering in state 0 is non-negative (2) the net expected utility when entering at state n − 1 is non negative and (3) the net expected utility when entering in state n is non-positive. (1) and (2), together with the concavity of U n (α, n; R, r), ensure that the net expected utility in states n ∈ [0, n] is non negative. (3) ensures then that n is the optimal threshold strategy for a new customer, when all other customers adopt the threshold strategy n. Therefore, n is an equilibrium threshold strategy. Conditions (1), (2) and (3) are thus:
For n = 1, ξ = 1. We can determine min (n + 1, ξ (β) − 1) for n = 0, n−1 and n: min (1, n − 1) = 0, min (n, n − 1) = 0 and min (n + 1, n − 1) = 0 respectively. Substituting this in the expression for t n (α, β), and subsequently in U n (α, β; r, R) we obtain that the following conditions are equivalent to (1), (2) and (3):
Mixed strategy equilibria: Assume that the threshold strategy of all other customers is β > 0 and let n < β < n + 1, with n ∈ N. As U n (α, n; R, r) is concave in n, a new customer will adopt also a (mixed) threshold strategy β if and only if (1) the net expected utility when entering in state 0 is non-negative, (2) the net expected utility when entering at state n is exactly equal to zero, and (3) the net expected utility when entering at states n ≥ n + 1 is negative. (1) and (2), together with the concavity of U n (α, n; R, r), ensure that the net expected utility is non-negative in states n ∈ [0, n].
(2) ensures then when entering in state n, the new customer is indifferent between joining or not.
In other words, the customer is indifferent between a balking at n or at n + 1. (3) ensures that balking in states n ≥ n + 1 is always optimal when all other customers adopt strategy β. Therefore, any (mixed) strategy in [n, n + 1] belongs to the best response set of a new customer when all other customers adopt strategy β. As β ∈ [n, n + 1], β is an equilibrium threshold strategy. Conditions
(1), (2) and (3) can be written as
Since U n+1 (α, β; R, r) < U n (α, β; R, r), the latter condition is always satisfied. Therefore, the first two conditions are sufficient to characterize mixed strategy equilibria.
Proof of Proposition 6.
When r = 0, any α ∈ [0, 1] is possible in equilibrium. Note, however, that U n (α, β; R, 0) < U n (0, β; R, 0) for α ∈ (0, 1]. Therefore, for any equilibrium n with α > 0 that satisfies U n−1 (α, n; R, 0) ≥ 0 and U n (α, n; R, 0) ≤ 0, there exists a larger equilibrium with α = 0. Thus, the equilibrium is de-
and n = V −R ct − 1 satisfy the two inequalities. Taking the larger of the two, we conclude that for any value of
. When r > 0, α = 1 is the unique equilibrium. We prove that the equilibrium with the longest queue length must necessarily be a pure strategy equilibrium. In the remainder of this proof, we will suppress α, R and r in the expression U n (α, β; R, r) for simplicity and use U α n (β) instead. Take the largest β such that U 1 β (β) = 0; this is the largest mixed strategy equilibrium. We will show that there exists a k such that U 
we are done: β + 2 is a pure strategy equilibrium. If not, and U
Repeating the same argument, we will eventually find a k such that U 1 β +k ( β + k) ≤ 0. This is because lim k→∞ U 1 n (n) = −∞. Thus, a mixed strategy equilibrium can never be the longest queue equilibrium.
Lemma A 2 The limiting probability that the true system is in state n when all customers follow the threshold strategy profile β ∈ R + is p n (β) =
(1−ρ)ρ n 1−ρ n+1+ψ , n = 0 . . . n and p n+1 (β) =
(1−ρ)pρ n+1 1−ρ n+1+ψ , n = 0 . . . n, with (1 − p) + pρ = ρ ψ . The expected steady-state profit rate is
Proof of Lemma A 2: The threshold strategy profile β gives rise to a birth-death Markov process with the following transition rates:ρ i,i+1 = Λ, i = 0 . . . n − 1,ρ n,n+1 = pΛ and µ i,i−1 = 1/t, i = 1 . . . n + 1. Recall ρ = Λt. The balance equations for this Markov process are    p n = ρp n−1 , n = 1 . . . n p n+1 = pρp n , which can be rewritten as
π (β, α; R, r) is now obtained using the above expressions.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Remember that Ω 0 (n) . = {(R, 0) ∈ R 2 + : β * (R, 0) = n} and with Proposition 6, β * (R, 0) = v − R ct = n. From (A-7) in Lemma A 2, we obtain π (n, 0; R, 0) =
is a linear problem in R with a strictly positive coefficient. Let R n denote the profit maximizing fixed price as a function of n. The solution to the problem is to set R as high as possible while satisfying v − R ct = n. Therefore, Rn ct = v − n. For n = 0,ρ 0 (ρ) = 0 and also π 0 (0) = 0. Therefore, we obtain π 0 (n) = c (v − n)ρ n (ρ) for all n ≥ 0. Searching over all n ∈ N yields the profit maximizing equilibrium n 0 (ρ, v), which we substitute back to obtain R * 0 and π * 0 . We now derive the approximation for n 0 (ρ, v). We first show that for a given (v, ρ),
is solved by the unique value of n satisfying v
The profit maximizing value of n satisfies π 0 (n) − π 0 (n − 1) > 0 and π 0 (n + 1) − π 0 (n) < 0. Using π 0 (n) = c(v−n)ρ n (ρ) and simplifying, these two inequalities can be written as n−1+
. Rewriting the two inequalities, we obtain and solving for
For low values of ρ, we can use the following approximation:
If ρ ≈ 1 but less than 1, it can easily be proven that
For large values of ρ,
is approximated by solving for x in ρ x = v and we obtain
) and
). These variables define the following three cases for n ≥ 3:
II : R 12 (n) < 0 and R 13 (n) < 0 III : R 12 (n) ≥ 0 and R 13 (n) < R 12 (n) (A-9) and the following two cases for n = 1, 2:
The profit maximizing contract (R 1 (n), r 1 (n)) among those for which β * (R, r) = n has the following structure:
The optimal profit has the form π
c . When n = 1, 2, both cases yield profit
and r > 0.
Proof of Lemma A 3:
Remember that α * (R, r) = 1 when r > 0 and that by Proposition 6, β * (R, r) = n ≥ 1 if n is the largest integer that satisfies conditions (d), (e) and (f) in Proposition 5 for α = 1. Defining Ψ (n; R, r) . We now show that if n satisfies (A-11) and (A-12) with the latter inequality strictly satisfied, then β * (R, r) = n, otherwise, β * (R, r) = n + 1. By definition, Ψ (n; R, r) strictly increases in n. If (A-12) holds, we obtain n − 1 ≤ Ψ (n − 1; R, r) < Ψ (n; R, r) ≤ n ⇒ Ψ (n; R, r) − Ψ (n − 1; R, r) ≤ 1.
As Ψ (n; R, r) is strictly concave, it follows that Ψ (n + k; R, r) − Ψ (n + k − 1; R, r) < 1 for all k ≥ 1.
For any k ≥ 2, we obtain:
[Ψ (n + l; R, r) − Ψ (n + l − 1; R, r)] < k − 1 ⇒ Ψ (n + k − 1; R, r) − Ψ (n; R, r) < k − 1 and, as Ψ (n; R, r) ≤ n, we obtain by adding the latter two inequalities that
Thus, it is impossible that n + k − 1 ≤ Ψ (n + k − 1; R, r) for k ≥ 2, which is one of the necessary conditions for n + k to be an equilibrium. For k = 1, if Ψ (n; R, r) < n, then it is impossible that n ≤ Ψ (n; R, r) and n is the largest equilibrium. If Ψ (n; R, r) = n, then, in fact n + 1 is the largest equilibrium (with n also an equilibrium) since it is the largest value satisfying A-11. Indeed, the above argument shows that there is no larger equilibrium.
We now write Ω 1 (n) . = {(R, r) ∈ R 2 + : n − 1 ≤ Ψ (n − 1; R, r) ≤ n, n ≥ Ψ (n; R, r) and Ψ (min (1, n − 1) ; R, r) ≥ 0}. We would like to find the highest profit contract (r 1 (n), R 1 (n)) that results in the pure strategy equilibrium n as the longest queue equilibrium. To this end, we solve max (R,r)∈Ω1(n) R tρ n (ρ) + r. If Ψ (n; R, r) < n at the optimal solution, we're done. If equality holds, then n and n + 1 both exist.
By imposing Ψ (n; R, r) ≤ n − for arbitrarily small , we can exclude n + 1. By continuity, the corresponding profit is arbitrarily close to the profit under the case Ψ (n; R, r) = n and can be approximated by it. Therefore, for the purposes of making profit comparisons, we work with Ω 1 (n) as defined above.
Note that R tρ n (ρ) + r is increasing both in R and r (for a fixed n). As Ψ (n − 1; R, r) is decreasing in R and r and the constraints n − 1 = Ψ (n − 1; R, r) and Ψ (n − 1; R, r) = n are parallel in the (R, r) space, the constraint Ψ (n − 1; R, r) ≤ n can never be active at the optimal solution for any n. We therefore redefine Ω 1 (n) . = {(R, r) ∈ R 2 + : n − 1 ≤ Ψ (n − 1; R, r) , n ≥ Ψ (n; R, r) and Ψ (min (1, n − 1) ; R, r) ≥ 0} Since this is a two-dimensional linear programming problem with few inequalities, we break the problem down into subcases according to which corner point will be the optimal solution. This allows us to characterize the optimal solution in closed form for the three resulting subcases. We start with n ≥ 3.
For n ≥ 3, we need to solve the following LP:
The slope of the isoprofit line is − t ρn(ρ) , that of the constraint Ψ (n − 1; R, r) = n−1 is −tI 1 n−1 (ρ), and that of the constraint Ψ (1; R, r) = 0 is −tI 1 1 (ρ). It can easily be shown that for n ≥ 3,
for n ≥ 3. Moreover, the feasible region is bounded above by (A-14) and (A-16) and below by (A-15). Finally, for n ≥ 3, the R-intercepts of the three constraints are distinct and ordered with that of (A-15) being the smallest and that of (A-16) being the largest. Thus, for the feasible region to contain points (R, r) with R ≥ 0 and r > 0, it is sufficient that (A-14) cross the R-axis at a positive value of R; this can be rewritten as v − (n − 1) − I 1 n−1 (ρ) > 0 and will be assumed to hold in the analysis below. We now use these facts about the problem structure to characterize the optimal solution.
Since the isoprofit line has a slope between the slopes of constraints (A-14) and (A-16), and the objective function is increasing both in R and in r, in the absence of (A-15), the optimal solution would be either (i) at the intersection of (A-14) and (A-16) if these lines intersected in the first quadrant, or (ii) at the intersection of (A-14) and the line R = 0 otherwise. With constraint (A-15), we also need to take into account where constraints (A-14) and (A-15) intersect. Let R 12 and R 13 , respectively, denote the R-intercepts of the intersection of (A-14) and (A-15), and of (A-14) and (A-16), respectively. We find that the optimal solution to the LP is given by exactly one of the following three cases:
(I) the intersection of (A-14) and (A-16) if R 12 ≤ R 13 and R 13 ≥ 0. An example (with R 12 ≥ 0 as well) is given in Figure 6. (II) the intersection of (A-14) and R = 0 if R 12 < 0 and R 13 < 0. An example is given in Figure   7 .
(III) the intersection of (A-14) and (A-15) if R 12 > R 13 and R 12 ≥ 0. An example (with R 13 ≥ 0 as well) is given in Figure 8 .
For n = 1, Ψ (min (1, n − 1) ; R, r) ≥ 0 coincides with (A-14) ; for n = 2, (A-16) is redundant.
Thus in both cases, only (A-14) and (A-15) need be considered. In addition, in both problems, the slope of the iso-profit function is equal to the slope of (A-14), so any feasible point on this line results in the optimal profit. The optimal profit expressions are π 1 (1) =
Note that if R 12 ≥ 0, then case III holds, otherwise, case II holds.
From the intersection of (A-14) and (A-16), we obtain  
From the intersection of (A-14) and (A-15), we obtain  
Let r k 1 (n) and R k 1 (n) for k = I, II, III denote the optimal solution to the LP in the three cases. Then we have r
To determine the values for k = II, we find the intersection point in case II:
Ψ(n-1;R,r)=n-1 Ψ(n-1;R,r)=n Ψ(n;R,r)=n r R π(n;R,r)=k Step 2. In (A-19), we use the following approximation:
( A-20) This approximation is obtained by using the first two terms of the Laurent series expansion of the expression for small ρ, observing that the expression goes to 1 in the limit, and concatenating the two at the value of ρ for which the expansion equals 1. on the value of v for which this approximation holds makes it impractical to use. In Case iia below, we develop an approximation for the case 2 n−3 < ρ which is arbitrarily close to this approximation for large v and holds for any v, so we focus on that approximation instead. For low values of ρ, using (1 + ρ) n ≈ 1 + nρ, we obtain the following approximation: v Since we know that π * 1 (v, ρ) = π I 1 n I 1 (v, ρ); v, ρ in this range, we conclude that π 1 (n 1 (v, ρ); v, ρ) ≥ π 0 (n 0 (v, ρ); v, ρ) with π 1 (n 1 (v, ρ); v, ρ) ≈ π 0 (n 0 (v, ρ); v, ρ) for large ρ.
Case (ii): If
For ρ ≥ √ v, we have that n 1 (v, ρ) ≈ n 0 (v, ρ) ∈ {1, 2} and π * 1 (n) = π 
